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Abstract: Initially triggered in the USA and generated by the chaos in the financial system of the
country, the economic crisis has spread in Europe and, thanks to globalization, as a domino effect has
spread around the world. Although the first part of 2008 South East Europe has lived with the belief that the
countries in this region will be immune to the crisis, since September 2008, the situation has changed
notably in these states. The purpose of this study is to describe the issues related to the economic crisis and
its  impacts  on  South-Eastern  European countries.  The first  part  of  the  study highlights economic  and
financial crisis origins, while in the second part the effects of the global crisis are presented and the last part
states about implications of the crisis in South-Eastern Europe states.
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INTRODUCTION
This study provides a brief overview of the global financial and economic crisis’s impact on
South-Eastern Europe countries. To estimate the implications of the recession in the region, it is
particularly  important  to  take  into  account  two essential  aspects  which  differentiate  South-East
Europe from other regions. First, it should be considered that the countries in the area have passed
through  a  process  of  transition  from  a  planned  economy  to  a  market  economy.  Secondly,  the
transitional process has involved multiple changes regarding the economic integration of South-East
Europe and the near-complete forwarding of international trade flows. Therefore, in the last decade,
South-East Europe has experienced a transformation process, unprecedented in the region’s history.
Democratic reforms, regional cooperation and integration in the economic and financial markets are
considerable progress, which were inconceivable 10 years ago.
However, this continuous development was stopped by the financial and economic crisis, a
phenomenon initially considered not to be disruptive for South-East Europe. The economic reality
proved the opposite and thereby in the fourth quarter of 2008, the region faces severe financial
turmoil.
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This situation is stressed out by the evolution of the main macroeconomic indicators: the
GDP, the unemployment  rate, the inflation  rate  and  foreign  direct  investment  flows  that  have
undergone substantial changes throughout the region.
What results from the survey is that, even though the countries of South-East Europe region
have  been  affected  with  a  certain  delay,  the  negative  effects  were  more  pronounced  than  in
developed economies case.
1. ORIGIN OF THE CRISIS
On a theoretical there is no agreement regarding an economic model which can explain the
crisis. There is not just one explanation of the economic crisis causes and consequently the anti-
crisis  solutions  formulated in  macroeconomic  theory  differ substantially  from  one  approach  to
another.
The main schools of thought which tackled the problem of business cycle and financial and
economic crises are Keynesian, Monetarist and the Austrian School of Economics and Law (Evans
and Baxendale, 2008).
The first school of thought is represented by John Maynard Keynes and his followers from
Cambridge-England (Joan Robinnson) and Cambridge-Massachusetts (Gregory Mankiew and Paul
Krugman). The second one is also known as the Chicago school and is represented mainly by
Milton  Friedman,  but  also  R.J.  Lucas. The  most  important  thinkers  of  the  Austrian  School  of
Economics  who  had  important  contributions  in  terms  of  crisis  theory  are  Ludwig  von  Mises,
Murray N. Rothbard, F.A. von Hayek.
The  theories  and  explanations  provided  within  the  first  two  schools  of  thought  and  their
versions  (neokeynesist,  post – keynesist,  neoclassical  theories),  have  practically  dominated
economic thought in 20th century and still dominate it. Keynesism and monetarism followers accept
institutional  arrangement  in  the  monetary,  financial  and  banking  field:  fractional  reserves,  the
Central Bank with the role of lender of last resort and paper currency (Huerta de Soto, 2010).
Unlike these, the economists of the Austrian School of Economics have argued in the context
of both 1929 and the present crisis, that at the base of crisis and economic cycles sit institutions and
institutional arrangements such as fractional reserves and paper currency (fiat money) because they
allow the artificial expansion of credit and money supply of the banks, causing serious imbalances
in the capital structure and finally leading to severe financial and economic crisis.C CE ES S W Wo or rk ki in ng g P Pa ap pe er rs s
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From this perspective, the question of financial and economic crisis is much more serious, as
the crisis of the last century genealogy and their magnitude occurs, mixed with the entire evolution
of the global financial system and especially  with its gradual nationalization, financial-banking
system is one of the sectors most heavily nationalized and regulated (Rothbard, 2002). In the
current crisis case, on the one hand keynesist-type approaches are in difficulty because aggregate
demand, including raw materials and inputs (coached by the boom in the real estate sector and
vehicles construction) was generally high and it cannot be said that a drop in aggregate demand has
triggered  the  crisis,  but  rather,  this  decrease  has  occurred  in  the  context  of  the  crisis  and  was
installed after triggering it. On the other hand, neither the monetary explanations have not been
more successful, because inflation was generally under control.
So economists, investors and consultants, who predicted the current crisis, are part of another
economic thinking, which has its roots in Austria of the 19th century, and for this reason is called
the Austrian School of Law and Economics. According to Austrian theory, economic imbalances
occur in conditions of unanticipated effects by the market actors, credit expansion, which leads to a
lack  of  coordination  at inter-temporal level  of  the production structure.  In  other  words,  credit
expansion and creation of new trend and new fiduciary tools stimulates and feeds the artificial
development  of  productive  capacities  of  some  sectors,  either  IT  sector,  real  estate  or financial
securities market.
This explains the current economic crisis facing the global economy, the crisis that has often
been defined, not only in the media, or by international organizations such as the International
Monetary Fund ( Hamilton and Quinlan, 2009) but also by economists such as Alan Greenspan as
''crisis of the century”. Its beginnings are somewhere in 2001 when the USA FED interest rate
dropped by 1% to revive the USA economy, shaken by the September 11 attacks, but also economic
relax after stunning era ".com", namely the development of Internet-related companies in 1995-
2001.
The Federal Reserve System decreased the interest rate no less than 27 times between 2001
and 2003, and these low interest rates have facilitated rapid growth of loans.
Easing credit conditions led to a natural reaction of individuals, to access the easy loans
hoping that they will have the opportunity to refinance them in more advantageous conditions.
Therefore many Americans abandoned rent in favour of buying their own property, since
banking institutions had started to borrow money for purchase of houses, the so-called "subprime
loans”, so that, in 2006, the statistic revealed a quick ascent of houses prices, reaching 124% during
the last decade (Montuschi, 2009). The climax seems to manifest itself only in the moment in whichC CE ES S W Wo or rk ki in ng g P Pa ap pe er rs s
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the major financial institutions have shown interest in purchasing public effects, starting from the
premise of achieving significant profits, with a low risk, but no one at that time was not aware the
danger they were exposed to (Johnson, 2009). Some examples are renowned institutions such as
Morgan  Stanley,  Lehman  Brothers,  Goldman Sachs,  which have  been  captured  in  this  vicious
circle.
Therefore, it all started  in the banking system,  which is the base of the entire American
system, and these turbulences formed the basis of the financial crisis, destabilizing the world's
markets.
2.EFFECTS OF THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS
The financial crisis through which we pass is unprecedented in post-war economic history.
Triggered initially in the United States and generated by the chaos of country’s financial system, the
economic crisis has spread in Europe and, due to globalization, as a domino effect, it has spread
throughout the world. Most countries of the world felt it, but mainly developed economies that have
experienced a decrease or even stagnation in economic growth rate, and with rare exceptions, mild
increases.  Less  affected  states  by  the  crisis  are  emerging  economies,  sometimes  more  loosely
integrated into global capital markets, an example in this case being China, which has a capital
market less integrated into global markets, without being fully liberalized.
The international financial and economic crisis has induced primarily distrust in financial
institutions functionality of contemporary capitalism, had unavoidable adverse effects on global
economic growth, interest rates and unemployment, devaluation of the national currency, increased
current account deficits and public debt, and last but not least has created political, strategic and
social problems.
In late summer of 2007 we talk about the first signs of acute instability among banks. A first
consequence of current acute crisis is bankruptcy of banking and credit institutions of the United
States and the European Union. It generated the mistrust that led to serious imbalances in the stock
market, the value of the shares dropping at times so much, that it was necessary to suspend the stock
transactions for a specific period of time.
Contrary to the principles of modern capitalism, most countries have nationalized a significant
part of the financial system in a desire to prevent the bankruptcy of banks and other financial
institutions. An example of this is the injection of 540 billion dollars by the FED in retirement funds
and 700 trillions of dollars to banks and insurance companies threatened with bankruptcy. Likewise,C CE ES S W Wo or rk ki in ng g P Pa ap pe er rs s
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England has granted £ 20 billion on loans made by banks for small and medium enterprises, and
Germany 100 billion euros.
Another  effect  is the decrease  of  production  in  most  European  States  such  as  Germany,
England, France, Spain, and Italy and others. Even more, exports also decreased substantially as the
fast pace of trademarks expansion in this decade has been drastically reduced. The global slowdown
has reduced demand for consumer goods and industrial products, reducing earnings from exports.
For  example,  in  Russia  due  to  decrease  in  price  of  crude  oil  export  earnings  have  dropped
substantially.  Thus,  world  trade  has  experienced  significant  decreases,  trade  credit  has  become
increasingly  rare  and  more  expensive,  while  industrial  firms  were  left  helpless  in  the  face  of
declining demand.
By reducing the demand for consumer goods, a number of companies went bankrupt reducing
the number of employees and wages.
The  crisis  has  had  a  major  negative  effect  on  investment  in  emerging  markets, portfolio
investments dropping drastically. In addition, foreign capital inflows have been strongly affected by
the financial crisis, the decline being considerable, especially in 2009.
Unfavourable financial and economic conditions have affected the transnational corporations
from  all  regions  of  the  world,  which  are  constrained  to  reduce  drastically  the  expenditure  for
investment, which has led to a strong rebound of FDI flows received or generated globally in 2008-
2009.
Figure 1- Trends in FDI flows received globally and on major groups of economies in 1995-2010
-in million dollars-
Source: graph generated by author after UNCTAD database.
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The powerful descendant trend of global FDI flows under the impact of the global crisis has
put an end to the cycle of four years of uninterrupted growth of these flows, which culminated in
2007 with a historical level of more than 2,000 billion dollars. After a decline of 16% of FDI flows
worldwide received in 2008, their volume crashed with a further 37% in 2009, reaching out to
overcome value threshold of 1,000 billion dollars, as shown in the previous chart.
The volume of global FDI flows received has increased only marginally in 2010, respectively,
with less than 1%, from 1114 billion dollars in 2009 at 1122 billion dollars in 2010.
The last monitoring report on investment activity at a global and regional level, published by
UNCTAD, reveals that global FDI reached around $ 1.5 billion in 2011.
Therefore, the stagnation of investment activity at international level is a matter of serious
concern,  especially  due  to  the  fact  that  public  investments  and  economic  incentives  packages
initiated by the Governments of the world in order to combat the negative impact of the global
economic and financial crisis are about to exhaust their effects, and private investments like FDI,
representing the decisive prerequisites for economic growth and development have not yet resumed
their role as starter of economic growth.
3. ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE
If on the one hand, by mid-2008, economies like the United States, United Kingdom, France,
Germany, and Japan have already been affected by the economic crisis, on the other hand, the
countries from South-Eastern Europe continued to grow. In the first eight months of 2008, those
states have lived with the confidence that South-Eastern Europe will be immune to the crisis, but as
of September 2008, the situation has changed notably for those countries.
The main channels of transmission of the crisis in South-Eastern Europe have been more
indirect  than  direct  and  have  included:  international  trade,  foreign  direct  investment,  monetary
policy, and the remittances of migrant workers.
Regarding the effects of the crisis in this area, they were embodied in the decrease of the
growth rate of gross domestic product and foreign direct investment flows, increasing inflation and
the increase of the unemployment rate.
Thus, as regards to the rate increase of the gross domestic product, which fell significantly
across the region, but can be seen from the table below that Romania has experienced since the end
of 2008, early 2009, with the outbreak of the crisis in the region, the biggest decrease of 6.6%,
closely followed by Croatia with 6%. Over the next three years the crisis shows that in general thisC CE ES S W Wo or rk ki in ng g P Pa ap pe er rs s
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indicator began to record a positive trend, with the exception of Greece, the only country in the
region with a growth rate of negative GDP in 2012. However, the level of GDP is lower than pre-
crisis, moreover is much dependent on international and European evolutions.
Table1- GDP real growth rates (%), 2007 – 2012
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Croatia 5,1 2,2 -6 -1,2 0,6 0,8
Macedonia 6,1 5 -0,9 1,8 3,1 1,8
Albania 6 7,7 3,3 5 1,8 1,2
Bosnia and Herzegovina 6,8 5,7 -3,1 0,8 1,8 0,5
Montenegro 10,7 6,9 -5,7 2,5 2 1,9
Serbia 5,4 3,8 -35 1 1,9 1,1
Romania 6,3 7,3 -6,6 -1,6 2,5 1,6
Bulgaria 6,4 6,2 -5,5 0,4 1,7 1,4
Greece 3 -0,2 -3,3 -3,5 -6,9 -4,4
* Estimations of World Bank
Source: computed by author after World Bank and Eurostat data.
In order to highlight the impact of the crisis on one of the most important macroeconomic
indicators we have conducted a comparative analysis of the increase  rate in GDP between the
average of Southeast Europe countries and the EU-27 average. Here it can be seen that the region of
South-Eastern Europe felt the beginning of the crisis most powerful compared to the rest of Europe,
a fact evidenced by the GDP growth rate, which has dropped dramatically in 2009 to 5.99%, as can
be seen in the chart below.
Figure 2- GDP growth rate in South- Eastern Europe vs EU 27 countries (%)
Source: graph generated by author after World Bank and Eurostat data.
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Figure 3- Annual inflation in South- Estern Europe vs EU 27 countries
Source: graph generated by author after World Bank and Eurostat data.
In line with the GDP growth rate, annual average inflation is also significant. In the chart
below you can see that, between 2003 and 2007, South-Eastern Europe recorded a rate of inflation
cantered around 5%, but in 2008, inflation in the region has exploded, increasing by approximately
67% compared with the last year. For 2009, we can notice a noticeable difference between the EU-
27 average of only 0.8% and the ESE average of 2.7%, maintaining the upward trend so far.
Another indicator worth considering is the unemployment rate. As was expected, the crisis
repercussions on the labour market were felt both in the region and in the EU 27. Thereby we can
see that since 2007 the unemployment rate in South-Eastern Europe began to increase significantly
(16.3%).
The following years marked by crisis were unfavourable for the labour market, the average of
the South East area regarding the unemployment rate was almost double compared to the EU 27
average, actually trained by countries like Greece within the Southeast region which in December
2012, record the highest rate of unemployment (26.4%).
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Figure 3 - Unemployment rate in South - Eastern Europe vs EU 27 countries (%)
Source: graph generated by author after World Bank and Eurostat data.
As regards to foreign direct investment, statistics indicate that in the region they were three
times lower in 2011 (8.9 billion Euros) compared with 2008 (27.94 billion Euros) as result of the
economic and financial crisis. This phenomenon explains the fact that in the years preceding the
crisis, foreign direct investments have been concentrated only in certain sectors that were very
vulnerable with the advent of the crisis.
Regarding investors in the South-Eastern Europe area, it should be noted that most of the
direct foreign investments made here come from neighbouring European countries. An example in
this case is Austria, which has invested in nearly all the countries of the region, with the exception
of Macedonia, as regards the banking sector.
Table 2- FDI inflows (billion euro) for 2007-2011
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Albania 0,481 0,665 0,696 0,831 0,65
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1,52 0,684 0,18 0,174 0,25
Bulgaria 9,052 6,728 2,437 1,779 1,064
Croatia 3,651 4,219 2,38 0,281 1,2
Macedonia 0,506 0,4 0,145 0,159 0,21
Montenegro 0,683 0,656 1,099 0,574 0,3
Romania 7,25 9,5 3,49 2,22 1,92
Greece 1,54 3,07 1,75 0,281 1,3
Serbia 2,513 2,018 1,41 1,003 2,01
Total 27,2 27,94 13,59 7,3 8,9
Source: WIIW – Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, National Banks and UNCTAD, March 2012.
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CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of the main economic and financial indicators shows that South-Eastern Europe
countries have felt with a lag of about one year the joint effects of economic and financial crisis.
But  even  so,  the  effects  were  stronger  than  in  developed  economies,  and  recovery  from  the
economic recession was slower.
In the first place, 2009 brought the fall of the gross domestic product, due to the contracting
demand in the EU 27 partners and foreign direct investment. The most affected countries were
Romania and Croatia that have experienced the largest drop in GDP in 2009, -6.6% respectively -
6%.
Secondly, South-East Europe recorded significant differences compared to the EU 27 in terms
of inflation; for 2009 it can be seen that the average inflation in the EU 27 was only 0.8%, while the
average for the region of South-East Europe was 2.7%.
Third, the crisis has brought with it a major issue in social and economic terms, namely
unemployment. It has affected the whole Europe, but most of it was felt in the South-East Europe
region, where the average unemployment rate is almost double compared to the EU 27 average.
Therefore, to overcome the effects of the current financial and economic crisis are necessary
measures and structural reforms that will boost the competitiveness of the region. To achieve this,
the South-East Europe should explore more creative potential at its disposal.
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